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WOMEN'S BANKS AND WOMEN'S ACCESS TO
CREDIT: COMPETITION BETWEEN
MARKETPLACE AND REGULATORY
SOLUTIONS TO GENDER
DISCRIMINATION
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Ken Anderson**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970's, as more women entered the work force as man-
agers, laborers and entrepreneurs, women's credit and financing needs
intensified. Yet banks and other financial institutions persisted in dis-
criminating against women in extending credit.' This discrimination re-
flected a view that women were bad credit risks because they generally
had no independent source or control of income.2 Without access to
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1. For accounts of women's credit needs and discrimination against women in the 1970's
before women's banks were established and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 was
passed, see Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1973); Kendig, Discrimination Against Women in Home Mortgage Fi-
nancing, 3 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 166 (1973); Hyatt, No-Account Females: Women
Complain They Often Can't Get Credit Because of their Sex, Wall St. J., July 18, 1972, at 1, col.
6.
As the President of the American Banker's Association conceded in a 1973 interview,
"[blanks along with the rest of the credit industry, do in fact discriminate against women when
it comes to granting credit." Adams, Bankers Urged to Reconsider Assumptions Regarding
Women and Credit, AM. BANKER, June 25, 1973, at 22.
2. One standard credit manual, for example, identified divorcees, along with Indians liv-
ing on reservations and those living in untidy homes, as poor credit risks. M. NEIFELD,
NEIFELD'S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 512 (1961).
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credit, women could not develop independent sources of income, build
an asset base or develop their own credit histories. This in turn pre-
cluded future extensions of credit to women. Denial of access to credit
for women was a cause as well as an effect of women being excluded from
full participation in the economy.'
As one response to this credit discrimination, businesswomen and
liberal feminists organized "women's banks" that were aimed at provid-
ing banking services to women. The women's banks were originally
owned and operated by women and represented an effort to provide a
marketplace solution to the problem of gender discrimination in access to
credit. The number of women's banks grew rapidly nationwide, and be-
tween 1975 and 1980, nine women's banks had formed.4 The women's
banks commenced business with considerable optimism and liberal sup-
port. Amid much press coverage of its novel profit strategy, First Wo-
men's Bank of Manhattan (FWBM) opened its doors in 1975 as the
initial women's bank with such feminist luminaries as Betty Friedan on
its board of directors. Yet women's banks have never become a signifi-
cant force in the financial marketplace; on the contrary, the number of
women's banks has declined. The remaining women's banks have mini-
mal asset bases and have deliberately de-emphasized their original femi-
nist focus, stressing instead a muted, gender-neutral orientation.6
3. See Littlefield, Sex-Based Discrimination and Credit Granting Practices, 5 CONN. L.
REv. 575 (1973).
4. "[B]y 1979, there were nine [banks]; by 1982, that number had been reduced to eight."
Gardner & Mills, Women's Banks--Where to Now? THE BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at
40, 41. Identifying a "women's" bank is sometimes difficult because of variations in the crite-
ria for calling a bank a "women's" bank. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. By our
count there are now eight such banks: First Women's Bank of Manhattan, The Connecticut
Women's Bank, The Women's Bank (San Diego, California), The Western Women's Bank
(San Francisco, California), The Women's Bank (Denver, Colorado), The Women's National
Bank (Washington, D.C.) and The Women's Bank (Richmond, Virginia). See Gutis, In the
US. Fewer Women's Banks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, § III, at 13, col. 1. Some of these
banks have been changing their names as well as other features, leaving their status as a wo-
men's bank in doubt. See infra note 6.
5. See Witty, First Women's First Decade, ACROSS THE BOARD, Sept. 1985, at 70. Tech-
nically, the first bank owned and operated by women was a bank founded in 1919 in Clarkville,
Tennessee. See Weida, The Really First Women's Bank, THE BANKERS MAO., May-June
1979, at 59.
6. See, eg., Hellyer, What's in a Name? AM. BANKERS AS'N BANKING J., May 1979, at
104 (noting name change by The Women's Bank (San Diego, California) to California Coastal
Bank); Kaiser, What's in a Name Matters to Board of Women's Bank, Wall St. J., Apr. 13,
1984, at 4, col. 4 (noting that "[h]alf of the bank's customers are men, but the board thinks
that a more neutral name ... could boost profit"); Salamon, Idealism Gives Way to Laws of
Business as First Women's Bank Heads for Recovery, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1981, at 25, col. 4
(quoting new First Women's Bank of Manhattan (FWBM) President Judy Mello, "'We aren't
running around finding women to do good things for' ").
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Indeed, by early 1987, FWBM had announced plans to fire its woman
president and replace her with a man to coincide with an infusion of new
capital from a largely male controlled investment group.7
This Article examines how and why the women's banks came to
abandon women as their primary target market. It seeks to explain why
women's banks were unable to carry out their agenda of remedying
credit discrimination against women and why women's banks exper-
ienced lower profitability than other banks.
First, we critique the internal logic of the women's banks' target
market strategy. 8 Women's banks sought to exploit a market inefficiency
created by irrational sexist discrimination in the capital markets;
creditworthy women's enterprises presented a profit opportunity not cap-
tured by traditional banks with misogynist lending practices. This Arti-
cle questions, however, whether women's banks could exploit that
market inefficiency when they necessarily obtained their capital for mak-
ing loans from those very same sexist capital markets. If the general
capital market perceived women's loans as bad loans, then presumably it
would reflect that perception by extending funds to women's banks at a
proportionately higher cost of capital. This higher cost would lower the
profitability of women's banks and discourage them from extending loans
to women.
Second, even if the market inefficiency envisioned by the women's
banks did create potential profit, the women's banks had to contend with
the tremendous pressures of bank deregulation which occurred between
1975 and 1986.9 Because bank deregulation made profitability more vol-
atile, banks of all types and sizes-including women's banks-had to de-
vise new market strategies simply to survive. Thus, even if women were
a profitable target market, they were not sufficiently profitable for the
economic survival of women's banks, and women's banks were forced to
diversify their market strategies. Bank deregulation helped force wo-
men's banks to redirect their focus away from women.
Third, the passage of the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), 10 the 1977 Amendments to ECOA, 11 and the Federal Reserve's
7. See Kleinfield, Running First Women's Bank Is Now a Man's Job, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1987, § III, at 6, col. 1; Sex Change at the Bank, TIME, Feb. 9, 1987, at 53 ("A group of five
male and three female investors has acquired a 42% interest in the bank for $2.9 million and
has offered $7.1 million for the rest.").
8. See infra text accompanying notes 20-52.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 53-78.
10. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-
1691f (1976)).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976).
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implementation of Regulation B (Reg B)12 undermined the existence of a
target market of unserved, creditworthy women.' 3 ECOA was an inten-
tional legislative response to outlaw credit discrimination against women.
Thus, rather than offering a marketplace solution to the problem of gen-
der discrimination, ECOA changed the rules of the market itself. To the
extent that ECOA successfully remedied credit discrimination against
women, women's banks no longer had an unserved population to target.
As a result, the profitability of women's banks declined.14
This third explanation for the failure of the women's bank market
strategy-the legislative erosion of the target market-illustrates the ten-
sion between regulatory and market responses to an identified social
need.' 5 ECOA's goal was to end this need by regulatory fiat, while wo-
men's banks sought to fulfill it and simultaneously turn a profit. How-
ever, if the need disappears, so does the profit, and so too do women's
banks if they lack alternative sources of profitability.
The analysis results in three observations concerning women's banks
and women's struggle for access to credit. First, women's banks cannot
arbitrage sexism out of the marketplace at a rate faster than the general
capital market is willing to accept. 6 Women's banks, to a considerable
degree, serve as a conduit for capital priced according to the sexist per-
ceptions of the capital markets. Second, insofar as eliminating gender
discrimination in access to credit is a socially desirable goal, regulatory
solutions to credit discrimination are necessary because marketplace so-
lutions are inadequate. Rather than contributing to the end of credit
discrimination, marketplace solutions will simply reflect whatever
prejudices exist in the market.' 7 Third, a regulatory solution which elim-
inates credit discrimination displaces marketplace solutions which are
aimed at making a profit from this target group.' 8 Thus, a completely
successful ECOA displaces women's banks which pursue a wholly wo-
men-oriented target market strategy.19
Each of these observations has significant qualifications. The ac-
count as a whole, however, offers some guidance concerning the direction
of the struggle to end gender discrimination in credit access. There is no
substitute for changes in the market rules themselves because the internal
12. 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.14 (1986).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 79-91.
14. Id.
15. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
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forces which might arbitrage sexism out of credit practices are insuffi-
cient to move the market to eliminate sexism. Therefore, this Article
argues that the only suitable response is stringently enforced regulation.
II. THE PROFIT STRATEGY OF THE WOMEN'S BANKS
The women's banks began with an insightful profit strategy: target
creditworthy women who experienced irrational discrimination from
traditional lending institutions.20 Because this was an untapped market,
women's banks would initially avoid competition from other banks and
would gain a competitive edge in the market for women borrowers in the
future. Despite the apparent soundness of the strategy, women's banks
experienced profitability lower than similarly situated traditional
banks.21 Moreover, women's banks never became a significant nation-
wide alternative means of credit for women.22 This is partially because
the women's banks' profit strategy was internally inconsistent, focusing
primarily on a lending market and less on the source and cost of capital.
Since women's banks obtained their capital from the general capital mar-
ket, they could not sufficiently free their lending decisions from the sexist
prejudices of that capital market. With some qualifications, this explains
in large part why women's banks experienced relatively low profitability,
20. For descriptions of such irrational credit discrimination, see Hyatt, supra note 1.
Gardner & Mills, supra note 4, describe the women's bank strategy, but place the blame for its
failure partly on management inexperience and partly on the inability of women's banks to
commit the necessary marketing funds:
The idea of targeting women customers--scoffed at by some when First Women's
Bank opened its doors in 1975-is being actively pursued today by some of the larg-
est banks in the United States.... Women's banks were actually ahead of the game
in recognizing this idea.
[.. The idea of targeting women as customers was not accompanied by the
necessary marketing budgets in the women's banks to insure success. Large banks
today are committing funds to market segmentation in the belief that they will pay
big dividends.
Gardner & Mills, supra note 4, at 44 (emphasis in orginal).
Our viewpoint is substantially different from the view expressed by Gardner and Mills.
The failure of the women's banks to achieve relative profitability reflects more than a mere
failure to commit enough funds to marketing budgets. The movement of large, traditional
banks into the women's market reflects both gains in women's aggregate economic wealth and
changes in the perceptions of the general capital marketplace towards women and women's
businesses. The relatively low profitability of women's banks also reflects more than simple
management inexperience. Unlike Gardner and Mills, we argue that targeting women as a
market was a structurally flawed strategy, not merely poorly executed, and that experienced
women's bank management showed its acumen precisely by abandoning the strategy.
21. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 4.
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and why marketplace solutions to gender discrimination are generally
inadequate.
The women's banks sought to attract women customers by identify-
ing themselves as "women's banks." Some indicators of a "women's
bank" include: women's ownership of over half of its stock interest, wo-
men's control of significant blocks of stock, women dominating the board
of directors, women as the bulk of employees, bank charter provisions
emphasizing service to women, the word "women" in the bank name,
women as the target market for lending, women as the principal source
of deposits and lending criteria favorable to women.23 All these factors
distinguished women's banks from the more traditional banks. Never-
theless, despite these characteristics, women's banks shared fundamental
features with traditional banks, leaving them vulnerable to control by the
capital markets. These shared features also led to an inconsistent profit
strategy and thwarted the original goal of providing women access to
credit while achieving a profit.
First Women's Bank of Manhattan (FWBM), for example, billed
itself as a "women's bank. "24 Its top management, board of directors
and significant shareholders consisted largely of women.2" The bank's
name emphasized its commitment to women's financial services. It pub-
licized its policy of applying lending criteria favorable to women.26 Yet
FWBM remained dependent upon traditional capital institutions for its
source of funds. For example, the bank publicly traded its shares, and
anyone, male or female, could purchase them. FWBM had to consider
both its fiduciary duty to its shareholders and its fundamental need to
make a profit or face shareholder flight. In 1982, the bank management
endorsed an ultimately unsuccessful tender offer by a Brazilian invest-
ment group to acquire at least fifty-one percent of the outstanding
shares. 27 It had to fight off a male dissident ex-director who claimed he
23. For a discussion of these factors in the context of one women's bank, The Women's
Bank (Denver, Colorado), see Johnson, Bank Head Nearing 'American Dream,' The Denver
Post, Oct. 10, 1977, at D27, col. 1.
24. "The First Women's Bank was organized to provide access to credit for women and
men... in a non-discriminatory.. . manner.... The Bank does not 'favor' women but it has
a special obligation and relationship, having as its main criteria the credibility of the woman's
or man's finances." FWBM 1985 Press Release from The First Women's Bank (1985) (dis-
cussing organization of FWBM) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office)
[hereinafter Press Release].
25. See Salamon, supra note 6.
26. See supra note 24.
27. See First Women's Bank Adds 3 Ex-Dissidents to Board, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1983, at
24, col. 2; Brasilinvest Ends Bidfor First Women's, Wall St. J., May 3, 1983, at 14, col. I; First
Women's Bank Says Its Board Slate Defeated Dissidents, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 2, col. 6;
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wanted to "preserve the institution as a women's bank"28 but sought to
acquire thirty-five percent of the shares. By 1987 it had announced plans
to take on a male president, and a male-dominant group of shareholders
had bought a forty-two percent interest in the bank, with an offer to ac-
quire the rest.29
Yet women's banks originally believed that they could both maxi-
mize shareholder profits and pursue an anti-discrimination policy. They
reasoned that in an efficient capital market, those who sought credit and
could repay at market interest rates should receive credit.30 As women
moved into the market economy as businesswomen, professionals, man-
agers or consumers, they began seeking credit to finance their activities.
Like anyone else seeking credit, some women would have solid ideas and
plans with strong probabilities of repayment, while others would not. In
an efficient capital market, the former ought to receive credit and the
latter ought not, while the projects with higher risk should receive credit
at an appropriately adjusted interest rate.
But the credit allocation system-banks, other financial institutions
and the capital market-traditionally has been overlaid with irrational
and inefficient sexism. This irrational sexism has persisted despite the
fact that a profitable return could be made from creditworthy women's
enterprises.3 1 Irrational sexism exists in the capital markets insofar as
the rules and practices of credit allocation have not kept pace with the
changing social mode of production which incorporates women into the
labor market not only at the working class level, but also at the small-
business and managerial levels where their assets represent an opportu-
nity for a profitable return.32
The inefficiency created by irrational sexism produces an opportu-
nity to make a profit by lending to creditworthy women denied credit at
traditional institutions. Women's banks seek to profit by capitalizing on
First Women's Bank Sues Ex-Director in Bid to Bar Stock Purchases, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1982,
at 18, col. 3.
28. See First Women's Bank Sues Ex-Director in Bid to Bar Stock Purchases, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 18, 1982, at 18, col. 3.
29. See supra note 7.
30. It has occasionally been argued that, as a psychological matter, women are better
credit risks than men, all financial factors being equal. See Smith, Measuring Risk on Con-
sumer Instalment Credit, 11 MGMT. Sci. 327 (1964); see also Baer, The Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act and the "Effects Test", 95 BANKING L.J. 241, 248 (1978). Of course, reliance on such
behavioral criteria assumes that women have income in the first place.
3 1. See supra notes 1-3.
32. "[IThe number of businesses owned by women rose from 1.9 million in 1977 to 2.5
million in 1980, a gain of 33.4 percent." More Women Owning Businesses, N.Y. Times, Feb.
23, 1984, at D14, col. 1 (reporting on a new study by the Small Business Administration).
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this neglected market of creditworthy women. In effect, this profit strat-
egy proposes a form of arbitrage which capitalism uses to purge from the
economy the cultural prejudices and irrational sexism which inhibit full
economic efficiency.33
In order to achieve this form of arbitrage, however, women's banks
would have to charge a higher-than-market interest rate. The ability of
women's banks to charge a higher-than-market interest rate is due to the
presence of women in the marketplace who need credit and cannot ob-
tain it elsewhere. According to the law of supply and demand, these
women should be willing to pay a premium to any bank willing to lend to
them, provided that the premium is not so high as to wipe out any future
return from investment of the loan proceeds.
This move seems counter-intuitive to the goal of women's banks to
provide women access to credit at a cost equal to, or even lower than, the
cost at a traditional bank. Nevertheless, only by charging this higher-
than-market interest rate could the women's banks, even in theory,
achieve the full arbitrage effect and force traditional financial institutions
to change their lending policies. If the women's banks were to achieve a
significant market presence while charging their women customers the
premium interest rate, they would succeed both in providing women with
an alternative source of credit and in pressuring the traditional financial
institutions to alter their lending policies. Rational investors would iden-
tify the extra profitability and invest more heavily in women's banks
33. Arbitrage is defined as the "[p]urchase of one security and simultaneous sale of an-
other to give a risk free profit." R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE, 809 (2d ed. 1984). The term has gradually come to be applied more broadly to
transactions which tend to push prices toward equilibrium.
This argument assumes that irrational sex discrimination in fact has existed in the capital
markets. It could be argued that there was no sex discrimination in lending when the women's
banks started, and that the women's banks' strategy was misguided because women with ade-
quate resources were, even in 1975 when First Women's Bank of Manhattan (FWBM) opened,
receiving credit from traditional banks. If this were true, then the real problem of credit dis-
crimination would not be discrimination so much as helping women gain the income necessary
to have adequate resources against which to make loans. This difference can be captured in the
terminology of "horizontal equity" between men and women of similar economic resources
and "vertical equity" which would redistribute economic resources downward to women with-
out income, partly by granting them credit for which they otherwise would not qualify. See
infra notes 92 & 95 and accompanying text.
This argument has considerable merit, but we offer two replies. First, the evidence re-
viewed in supra notes 1-3 suggests that there was considerable credit discrimination even
against women of adequate resources when the women's bank movement started. Second, we
are adopting the fundamental assumptions of the women's banks themselves in order to show
internal inconsistencies in the strategy. It was clearly an assumption of the women's banks
that irrational credit discrimination existed-that is, women of adequate resources were not
receiving credit, or in other words, horizontal equity between men and women did not exist.
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while divesting from traditional banks. Traditional banks would then
have an economic incentive to abandon their sexist lending criteria in
order to maintain maximum profitability. This possibility is offered as
counter-factual in order to demonstrate how they would have to behave
as economic actors to influence the capital markets, ignoring the fact that
women's banks never achieved a significant market presence.
If women's banks were to offer their women customers an interest
rate equal to the market rate, then the possibility of an arbitrage effect
would turn on whether the women's banks achieved higher profitability
relative to traditional banks. Higher profitability would depend on
whether the women's banks could generate a greater volume of business
than other banks of similar size. With profitability equal to or less than
that of traditional banks, investors would have little incentive to divest
from traditional banks and invest in women's banks. Thus, a women's
bank that extends credit at an interest rate equal to the market rate and
gained no additional profit would fail to bring about the arbitrage effect.
Similarly, if the women's banks were to offer an interest rate lower
than that urged by supply and demand, then the source of extra profit-
ability would disappear. Women's banks would not earn for their share-
holders an extra return not captured by traditional banks. Consequently,
shareholders would have no incentive to invest in women's banks and
divest from traditional banks. Traditional banks, in turn, would have no
incentive to change their practices to match the women's banks' extra
source of profits because women's banks would have denied themselves
that profit. The failure to capture a presumed source of higher profit
would deflect shareholders away from women's banks and retard the
banks' growth as players of any significance in the market. At a mini-
mum, this consideration suggests that the growth of women's banks as a
market force is not necessarily compatible with the goal of giving their
customers the lowest interest rate possible. Thus, there is a tension be-
tween the potential role of women's banks as arbitrage players in the
market and their role of offering low-cost, accessible capital to women.
Thus far this Article has discussed the arbitrage strategy as it relates
to bank lending practices while ignoring the source of those funds. Yet
insofar as the arbitrage strategy employs capital received from the gen-
eral capital markets which flows through women's banks as a conduit,
then the arbitrage is only apparent and not real. As a lending strategy, it
ignores the mechanism for pricing capital and thus ignores the cost of the
capital loaned.
The source of funds for women's banks is ultimately the general cap-
ital market, whether the funds stem from shares purchased or deposits
April 1987]
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made. The capital market, in the process of supplying women's banks
with capital, will assess the risk and potential return of women's bank
loans and set-that is, raise-the interest rate accordingly. This will oc-
cur either as depositors demand higher interest on deposits or as share-
holders demand greater return on equity.34 To the extent that the capital
market shares the irrational, patriarchal and sexist prejudices of tradi-
tional financial institutions, it will impose those prejudices by charging a
higher cost for capital, even if in subtle ways, to women's banks.31 This
leads to lower profitability for women's banks, and continued lower prof-
itability will lead women's banks to abandon women as a target market
strategy.36
34. This consideration, in effect, applies the Efficient Market Hypothesis to the specific
situation of women's banks as purchasers of capital. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note
33, at 117, 263.
35. It will be observed that the argument of this Article addresses irrational credit discrim-
ination against women seeking credit who, but for their gender, would meet traditional lending
criteria, that is, horizontal equity. It does not address rational credit discrimination-vertical
equity-based on the simple fact that a woman has no money. We have ignored this class of
women-principally working class and poor women-because the women's banks have never
taken an interest in that class anyway. Poor women do not represent the possibility of a profit-
able return. Those women do not count insofar as this discussion attempts to adopt the profit
strategy assumptions of the women's banks themselves. B. LaRae Orullian, President of the
Denver-based Women's Bank, summarized that the Women's Bank of Denver expressed the
view from the very beginning that women seeking loans "'will have to meet all the credit
requirements. Just because you walk through the door and you are a woman, that doesn't
mean you are going to be handed a loan.'" Johnson, supra note 23, at D27, col. 4 (quoting B.
LaRae Orullian). See supra note 35 and infra notes 92, 95.
The question of where women, who become suddenly poor by reason of divorce, fit into
these categories has not been satisfactorily answered either by women's bank strategy or legis-
lation on credit access. It is not clear whether these women will be regarded simply as poor
women not deserving of credit because, frequently lacking middle income employment and
raising children, they do not present a good credit risk or whether, alternatively, they will be
regarded as fundamentally "middle class" women irrationally denied credit because of their
gender. The credit industry, no doubt, would point out that even if they were unfairly pushed
out of the middle class, that does not make it irrational to deny them credit, and that forcing
the credit industry to grant them credit amounts to a vertical wealth transfer. Even those
supporting vertical equity would have to answer, in the context of newly-poor women, why
these women particularly deserve such wealth transfers over women who have always been
poor.
36. In addition to a higher cost of capital, women's banks may experience higher transac-
tion costs for two reasons. First, as small community banks, women's banks would not realize
whatever economies of scale are available to large, money center banks. Second, women's
enterprises are generally small businesses, and loans to these enterprises may be smaller than
the average loan at a larger bank. But the cost of processing a large or small loan is about the
same. Since a return is based on interest accrued from the principal, the return on a small
loan, however, would drop. FWBM noted in its 1984 Annual Report that the bank had re-
duced the documentation costs for variable rate co-op conversion loans, suggesting that there
is some truth to these transaction costs. FIRST WOMEN'S BANK OF MANHATTAN, 1984 AN-
NUAL REPORT 2 (1985) [hereinafter FWBM 1984 REPORT]. However, Benston and others
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The arbitrage theory suggests that if women's banks charge an inter-
est rate higher than or equal to the market interest rate, they will gain a
premium not captured by traditional banks. Where women's banks are a
significant force in the market, they would then cause traditional banks
to change their lending behavior. Yet the arbitrage theory fails to con-
sider the higher cost of capital that a sexist capital market will charge to
women's banks. Furthermore, charging a higher interest rate conflicts
with the goal of women's banks to offer their women customers access to
credit at a cost equal to, or even lower than, the cost at a traditional
bank. In fact, the supposed arbitrage effect forces women's banks to con-
form to the lending criteria of the traditional banks in order to maintain
profits and reduce the perceived risk of their loan portfolios. Women's
banks, therefore, could not expect to reduce irrational, sexist credit dis-
crimination at a rate any faster than the market as a whole reduces it.
This conclusion has two important qualifications. First, even if the
cost of capital is higher for women's banks, women's banks may still
provide an important arbitrage function because they are willing to lend
money to women and women's enterprises. If the option is between re-
ceiving and not receiving a loan, and not merely between receiving a loan
at a higher or lower interest rate, then women's banks may have created
a market that otherwise would not exist. Women's banks may lend to
women on their own credit histories unrelated to "responsible males,"3 7
and thus succeed in acting where the capital market and the traditional
banks failed. By providing loans to women, women's banks may already
have shifted the discussion of "to loan or not to loan" into a question of
pricing the loan.
This paradigm shift undercuts somewhat the earlier claim that wo-
men's banks reflect only the existing perceptions of the general capital
markets which might not have loaned the money at all. For if women's
banks are merely a conduit of capital for the capital markets, then why
would the capital markets allow women's banks to make loans which the
markets themselves would not make through traditional banks?
The answer to this question lies in the second qualification on the
conclusion that women's banks cannot arbitrage credit discrimination
out of the system any faster than the capital markets. The claim that
have suggested that there are not really economies of scale in retail banking, which would
make the effect of such transaction costs rather murky. Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey,
Scale Economics in Banking: A Restructuring and Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 435 (1982); see McCall, Economies of Scale, Operating Efficiencies and the Organiza-
tional Structure of Commercial Banks, 11 J. BANK REs. 95 (1980).
37. See supra notes 1-3.
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women's banks' lending activities are necessarily disciplined by the pref-
erences of their capital source ignores other non-market features of the
banking and credit system. Solely by virtue of having a bank charter, a
bank is entitled to certain standard privileges. Those privileges include
access to funds at the Federal Reserve Board's (Fed) discount window.
They also include access to deposit insurance which spreads some of the
risk of non-performing loans and bank failure among all banks and the
government. Moreover, women's banks have qualified as "minority"
banks under Fed guidelines, and thus receive preferential treatment in
holding government funds. Despite their volatility, government funds
can be a powerful boost to the bank's deposit base. 8
To some degree, a women's bank with a government-granted bank
charter is shielded from the unvarnished preferences of the capital mar-
kets. Women's banks, like other banks, receive privileges that protect
them from the sexist assessments of the capital markets. For example,
women's banks make independent decisions regarding how to commit
their money once they have it. And, if their view that loans to women's
enterprises are a source of profit were to prove correct, then presumably
the market would continue to supply them with money to continue such
loans. Furthermore, the subsidies women's banks receive-either di-
rectly from the federal government, through access to the Fed discount
window or through deposit insurance-partly offset the discipline im-
posed by the market in its pricing of funds.3 9
These two considerations qualify the conclusion that women's banks
can act no faster to eliminate gender discrimination than the general cap-
ital market. Of course, for women's banks to engage in arbitrage at all,
they must make profitable loans. Significantly, women's banks generally
have been less profitable than other traditional community banks of their
size and age."° Moreover, women's banks have been less profitable even
relative to similarly sized and aged community banks which the Fed has
38. FWBM, for example, states that "[tihe Bank has been designated as a minority bank
by the U.S. Treasury Department... and, accordingly, has obtained deposits from the U.S.
Government and Federal agencies." FWBM 1984 REPORT, supra note 36, at 11.
39. On the other hand, since all banks have these privileges, as Professor Hal Scott of
Harvard Law School has pointed out, it is unclear how these subsidies protect women's banks
from the capital markets relative to other banks.
In some states, women's banks receive state subsidies as well as federal subsidies. See,
eg., N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 2879(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (New York statute favoring
women's businesses).
40. See Gardner & Mills, supra note 4, at 42. Gardner and Mills, for example, note in
their study that the profitability of women's banks "has not, for the most part, kept up with
industry standards." Id.
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identified as "minority" banks.4 1
In fact, profitability has risen for women's banks as they have moved
away from their original market strategy of targeting women.42 A south-
ern California women's bank, for example, changed its management and
dropped the word "women" from the bank's name after three years of
losses.43 The Women's Bank of Denver, Colorado, eventually merged as
a subsidiary under a holding company in 1980," and in 1982 proposed to
open a new bank, Equibank South, that would not identify an emphasis
on women through its name.4' FWBM de-emphasized women as a tar-
get market, and instead focused on the boutique retail trade in the ten-
block radius around its Park Avenue location.4 Judy Mello, elected
president of FWBM in 1981, received full authority to shift strategies to
save the bank. As Mello told the Wall Street Journal, "'We aren't run-
ning around finding women to do good things for.' "I4 Instead the bank
now seeks wealthy individuals, professionals, and small to medium-sized
businesses and offers extremely high quality, personal service in return.48
Gender, except gender-neutrality in lending criteria, is no longer a major
issue.49 Simultaneously, profitability has risen."
The conclusion that the women's banks' lending strategy was flawed
because it did not consider the cost of capital, therefore, explains why
women's banks were less profitable than similar traditional banks. How
large a factor it was in comparison to bank deregulation
s and ECOA 52
cannot be determined with exactitude. Nonetheless, this failure indicates
the tendency of women's banks to abandon their profit strategy and con-
form to the lending criteria of traditional banks. However, a lesson can
41. Gardner and Mills found that profitability indicators for women's banks have not gen-
erally "reached the levels attained either by the minority bank population or by nonminority
banks of similar size and age." Id.
42. See id.; Gutis, supra note 4; Salamon, supra note 6.
43. See Hellyer, supra note 6.
44. WOMEN'S BANK [Denver, Colorado], 1981 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter WOMEN'S
BANK 1981 REPORT].
45. THE WOMEN'S BANK N.A., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 1 [hereinafter WOMEN'S BANK
1982 REPORT].
46. See Salamon, supra note 6.
47. Id. (quoting Judy Mello).
48. Id.
49. See Press Release, supra note 24.
50. Gardner & Mills, supra note 4, at 42 (Gardner and Mills report a rising return on
equity and return on investment for the women's banks in the early 1980's).
However, because profitability has not risen sufficiently, the bank has experienced a very
recent change in management and ownership. See supra note 7.
51. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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be learned from this. Arbitraging irrational sexism out of the capital
markets can only occur when the would-be arbitrageurs have, first, irrev-
ocable control over the use of capital, and second, access to capital at a
price reasonably free of sexist assumptions. While women's banks may
have met the first condition by virtue of the fact that they held a bank
charter and hence were entitled to make some irrevocable decisions
about the disposition of funds, they could not meet the second condition.
Even in the best of times, therefore, women's banks would be driven
from their market stategy of targeting women. The profit strategy was
internally inconsistent. But these were not the best of times for women's
banks; the pressures resulting from bank deregulation and the passage of
ECOA chiselled away at their target market from the outside. This Arti-
cle now considers the effect that these two factors had on women's banks.
III. BANK DEREGULATION
The inception of women's banks occurred at a time of considerable
tumult in the banking industry. 3 Bank deregulation to some extent
strengthened a bank's ability to compete with other financial institutions,
but it also eroded competitive barriers between banks and ended the rap-
idly crumbling protection which banks enjoyed against competition from
non-bank financial institutions.54 Women's banks experienced considera-
ble pressure from bank deregulation and the market forces which im-
pelled it.55 In response, women's banks began to abandon their initial
women-oriented strategy in favor of strategies offering higher profitabil-
ity.56 By magnifying the competitive pressures already existing in the
market, bank deregulation further explains both the lower profitability of
women's banks relative to other banks and the inadequacy of a market-
place solution to the problem of gender discrimination in credit access.
53. See Direction of the Financial Services Industry, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 965 (1985); Lor-
ing & Brundy, The Deregulation of Banks, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1985).
54. For a succinct analysis of the economics of bank deregulation, see COUNCIL OF ECO-
NOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 145-74 (1984).
55. As the 1982 Annual Report of the Women's Bank, Denver, Colorado, noted with some
understatement: "Deregulation in banking... [has] presented us with unusual challenges."
WOMEN'S BANK 1982 REPORT, supra note 45, at 1.
56. FWBM, for example, noted with understandable pride in its 1984 Annual Report that
"the year 1984 marked the seventh consecutive and the second highest year of profitability for
the Bank. This was achieved despite the impact of the deregulatory changes affecting the
banking industry in general .... FWBM 1984 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3. It achieved this
profitability by means of the strategy changes reported by Salamon, supra note 6, which is to
say it gave up women as its target market. FWBM noted in its 1984 Annual Report, for
example, that it had emphasized "matching assets and liabilities with particular attention di-
rected to variable rate fee oriented lending such as co-op conversions." FWBM 1984 REPORT,
supra note 36, at 2.
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Federal legislation deregulating banks affected four areas. The legis-
lation: (1) relaxed geographical restrictions on bank activities; 57 (2) ex-
panded the functional, economic activities permitted to banks; 8 (3) eased
entry restrictions into banking for non-banks; 9 and (4) deregulated inter-
est rates on deposits paid by banks.6 0
Geographical deregulation lifted some of the restrictions on inter-
state and intrastate branching, and interstate acquisitions of bank hold-
ing companies. The increased financial power of large banking chains
poses a significant threat to small community banks with few offices, 6
including most women's banks.6' Deregulating the functional activities
of banks has allowed larger banks to expand into previously forbidden
areas such as investment banking, brokerage, and other non-banking
lines of business. These banks possessed the resources necessary to take
advantage of these new opportunities and compete with other financial
services firms.63 But for small community banks, including women's
banks, these investment activities may be prohibitively expensive.
Through a loophole in the Bank Holding Company definition of a
"bank," legislation easing entry restrictions on non-bank holding compa-
nies has permitted national retail firms, such as Sears, to open nationwide
banking networks virtually overnight, along with complete brokerage
and investment services-not to mention retail shopping.' 4 The result
has been increased competition with both large and small banks.
The strongest impact stems from the deregulation of interest rate
57. See Loring & Brundy, supra note 53, at 358; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC
RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE U.S., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
(Jan. 1981).
58. See Rhoades, Interstate Banking and Product Line Expansion: Implications From
Available Evidence, 18 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1115 (1985).
59. See Lovett, Federalism, Boundary Conflicts and Responsible Financial Regulation, 18
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1053, 1062-63 (1985).
60. See Loring & Brundy, supra note 53, arguing that interest rate deregulation has been
the only substantive deregulation of banks.
61. See id. at 349, 353; see also DUN & BRADSTREET, A STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY BANKING (1984); FRASER & KOLARI, THE FUTURE OF SMALL
BANKS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT (1985); E. ROUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING
IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION (1984). But see Donoghue, Deregulation of Consumer Check-
ing Accounts Damages Banks, TR. & EST., Mar. 1983, at 26.
62. Women's banks are almost entirely single office, community banks. The Women's
Bank, Denver, Colorado, is apparently the only exception, and rather than a branch, it has a
separate bank, Equitable South, under the same holding company. See WOMEN'S BANK 1981
REPORT, supra note 44; WOMEN'S BANK 1982 REPORT, supra note 45.
63. See Lovett, supra note 59, at 1063.
64. See Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for
More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1984). For mention of Sears New Finan-
cial Services, see Lovett, supra note 59, at 1063.
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ceilings paid on deposits.6 5 Pressure to remove interest rate ceilings be-
gan in the late 1970's as banks found themselves noncompetitive with
money market accounts paying market interest rates. Although money
market accounts were not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), they offered a high return which partly offset this risk.
As a result, fifty billion dollars were drained from bank and savings and
loans savings deposits over the period from 1979 to 1982.66
These funds flowed out of all depository institutions, but the effect
was especially severe for community banks. FWBM was one of several
women's banks forced to recapitalize in this period, a move indicating a
decline in capital adequacy stemming in part from insufficient deposits.
67
In response, depository institutions demanded to compete on equal terms
by deregulating interest rate ceilings on their own accounts. 8 This move
proved especially risky for small banks because it removed the comforta-
ble, government-mandated structure in which all banking institutions,
large and small, paid the same maximum rate for depository funds.
6 9
Community banks would have to compete with larger banks and finan-
cial service organizations not only on interest rates received for loans, but
also on interest rates paid on deposits. Deregulation of interest rate ceil-
ings took place over several years with the final controls lifted in 1986
by the congressionally-mandated Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee.70 Women's banks faced the higher cost of deposits along
with other community banks. The Women's Bank, N.A., of Denver, for
example, reported in its 1982 Annual Report that "[tihe greatest single
expense experienced by the Bank was the cost of funds. Interest paid on
deposits increased 20 percent over the prior year."
'71
The combination of depression in 1980-82 and deregulation placed
new pressures on women's banks. Regarding managerial experience,
however, women's banks were no worse off than other community banks
facing deregulation for the first time. But by adhering to their market
strategy, women's banks lost relative profitability. In the difficult eco-
nomic years of 1980-81, commentators Gardner and Mills note, when
65. See Loring & Brundy, supra note 53.
66. See id. at 351.
67. See WOMEN'S BANK 1982 REPORT, supra note 45; Salamon, supra note 6.
68. See Loring & Brundy, supra note 53, at 351.
69. See id. at 356; Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. May 1984, at 6.
70. The Committee was created by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3524 (1982)).
71. WOMEN'S BANK 1982 REPORT, supra note 45, at 3.
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traditional banks reduced their consumer and commercial loans,
"[women's banks, in contrast, increased the proportion of funds invested
in these two categories.
'72
This lending policy reflected a desire to serve the credit needs of the
women's target market. However, a severe depression with spiraling in-
terest rates did not provide a favorable climate for lending money to
small, undercapitalized service industries and was an even less opportune
time to lend money to hardpressed consumers of either gender. During
this period, with surging personal and small business bankruptcies, the
"increase in default, combined with continuing write-off of bad loans
made in earlier periods, undoubtedly contributed to the poor perform-
ance of the loan loss ratio for women's banks." 73 The women's banks
eventually cured this downward trend by abandoning their original mar-
ket stategy.
Bank deregulation also put pressure on women's banks to merge
with other banks, both large and small. In general, the FDIC encourages
merger in lieu of liquidation since merger saves it from having to pay out
funds on insured accounts. Even without a threatened failure, however,
a small bank can combine with other small banks to diversify loan port-
folios and develop a staff sophisticated enough to manage increasingly
complex financial transactions, including matching maturities of assets
and liabilities.74 Or a small bank can also merge with larger banks to
obtain the same services. Women's Bank of Richmond, for example,
merged into First Virginia Bank, Inc., in 1984.7 1 Either way, the wo-
men's bank usually lost its identification with women. This loss of iden-
tity was virtually inevitable, however, given the failure of the women-
oriented target strategy.
The mere fact that the bank industry has been deregulated does not
entirely explain women's banks' lower profitability relative to other com-
munity banks of similar size and age.76 Other community banks faced
the same pressures as women's banks. Unlike community banks gener-
ally, however, women's banks did not abandon a losing financial strategy
fast enough but clung to management and strategy for several years even
when it was clear the banks were not doing well. The women's banks'
strategy did not fail because it was ineffectively implemented, but rather
72. See Gardner & Mills, supra note 4, at 42.
73. Id.
74. Heggestad & Wolken, Mergers and Acquisitions in Commercial Banking: Economic
and Financial Considerations, 18 LoY. L.A.L. Rnv. 1165, 1166 (1985).
75. See Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1984, at 53, col. 4.
76. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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because the strategy was inappropriate during a period marked by rising
costs of depositor funds, as well as unprecedented competition from
other banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, and severe economic
depression. In addition, other banks, hungry for profitable new markets,
abandoned irrational gender-discrimination practices to target the most
profitable women's businesses and female professionals. Some very large
banks, such as Chase Manhattan, even targeted the women's sector by
establishing a special women's branch that saved money by taking advan-
tage of Chase Manhattan's big bank automation, national marketing and
possible economies of scale.77 However, Chase Manhattan's women's
loan portfolio, unlike that of women's banks actively pursuing a women's
loan strategy, was a tiny part of a larger diversified portfolio of loans,
which reduced the risk from a strategy failure.
Lower profitability relative to other community banks may have
reflected-at least in part-rational perceptions in the capital market-
place of women's banks and their loan portfolios. Market participants
may hold economically irrational, sexist beliefs about gender and the
ability to repay a loan. But there is nothing irrational about an investor's
fear that a women's bank may be making risky loans when, in the middle
of a depression, it lends to consumers and small scale entrepreneurs of
either gender. Moreover, market participants might perceive that the so-
cial agenda of women's banks represents not a profit strategy for share-
holders, but instead subsidization of a social agenda using shareholder
capital.78
Such a perception is not aimed directly at the women's banks' profit
strategy as we have described it, since that strategy aims to return a profit
to the shareholders. However, some investors might well fear that the
profit strategy is really just rhetoric to cover a subsidization agenda. The
perception is rational to the degree that it is true, and it appears that in
the earliest days of women's banks, management was somewhat divided
as to their central purpose, or at least believed that enough profit would
be made to fund the social agenda without driving away shareholders.
Any tendency to subsidize a social agenda disappeared, however, with
changes in management in the wake of the failure of the women's banks'
market strategy to prove profitable. Nevertheless, such perceptions
could rationally depress stock value and profitability.
Because of rational and irrational perceptions in the marketplace, as
77. See Gutis, supra note 4.
78. To the extent this perception is true, it illustrates merely a rather convoluted form of
philanthropy effectively directed toward entrepreneurial and managerial women who meet
lending criteria, rather than toward poor and working class women who do not.
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well as highly intensified competition caused by deregulation, there is
considerable doubt concerning the women's banks' long term profitabil-
ity in serving women as a special market. Simultaneously, the ability of
the market to provide a meaningful alternative for women seeking credit
is also questionable. For those who would be certain that gender dis-
crimination plays no role in credit access, there remains the alternative of
a regulatory solution. But the regulatory solution, if effectively carried
out, may be mutually exclusive with the market solution over time, since
the regulation is designed to change the structure of the market.
IV. ECOA AND REG B: DID FEDERAL REGULATION UNDERCUT
THE WOMEN'S BANK TARGET MARKET?
ECOA,7 9 enacted in 1974 and amended in 1977, and its implement-
ing Regulation B (Reg B)s° comprise the existing regulatory solution to
the problem of gender discrimination in credit access. ECOA prohibits
anyone from denying credit on the basis of sex or marital status. The
question addressed here is whether ECOA and Reg B produced a change
in the market rules for granting credit which deprived the women's
banks of a significant portion of their target market. The general ten-
dency of ECOA and Reg B is to undercut the target market for women's
banks by providing women with greater options for obtaining credit.
However, this general tendency is mitigated first by loopholes in ECOA
which permit continued discrimination, second by a synergistic effect
where women's banks benefit from having a greater pool of women in the
commercial field, and third by the reportedly lax enforcement of the stat-
ute by the Federal Trade Commission, which is charged with policing the
Federal Reserve's Reg B.8'
The evidence suggests that the statute and regulations cure the most
blatant forms of credit discrimination. Furthermore, they have helped
change the climate for women applying for credit, while simultaneously
providing traditional financial institutions with more experience and
hence more confidence in serving creditworthy women. Even with these
enactments, there are still gaping opportunities for financial institutions
to discriminate against women. The wording of the statute and regula-
79. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976)), was passed in 1974 and became
effective in October 1975.
80. Regulation B is found at 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.14 (1986).
81. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.14(2) (1986); Jacobs, Women Owners, Bankers Argue Over Loan-
Bias Allegations, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
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tions is vague and lacks stringent enforcement.12
ECOA instituted formal changes in the credit granting process
which ostensibly give women greater opportunities to obtain credit. 3 By
forcing banks to take down the virtual "men only" sign on their doors,
ECOA encourages women to seek credit at traditional financial institu-
tions. This simple change reduces the pressure on women to seek out
alternative credit institutions, including women's banks, and thereby un-
dercuts the target market of the women's banks. This result occurred for
two reasons. First, for the women who no longer experience blatant dis-
crimination and who do receive credit from traditional institutions, wo-
men's banks do not present a necessary alternative. Expanding credit
opportunities for women undercut the target market of women's banks.
Second, women who experience discrimination when applying for
credit from traditional financial institutions will experience discrimina-
tion that is likely to be more subtle and therefore more difficult to detect
than in pre-ECOA days.84 Subtle discrimination may leave a woman un-
aware that she has been denied credit solely because of her gender. She
therefore is not aware she should seek out alternative credit institutions,
such as a women's bank. After hearing, for example, that she was denied
credit because she did not have enough assets to secure the loan, rather
than because of her low number of assets combined with her gender, a
woman might conclude that she was simply not creditworthy and aban-
don any attempt to seek credit."
Although the regulatory solution tends to reduce the target market
of women's banks, this effort is somewhat mitigated by the loopholes in
ECOA which permit continued discrimination. One such loophole con-
cerns the spousal cosignature rules. Reg B permits financial institutions
to inquire into the marital status of an applicant if the "applicant lives in
a community property state or is relying on property located in such a
state as a basis for repayment of the credit requested."86 Moreover, if a
married applicant requests unsecured credit and resides in a community
property state, or if the property on which the applicant is relying is
82. See Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 655, 690-95.
83. Cf Jacobs, supra note 81.
84. Cf Blakely, supra note 82, at 661-69.
85. See Jacobs, supra note 81. In reviewing attempts by Congress to stop discrimination
against women, congressional aides concede that various legislation introduced will have little
impact, noting that "'after all, no bank would write in a file that an applicant was rejected
because she was a woman.'" Id. (quoting a congressional aide).
86. See Taylor, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Spousal Cosignature Rules and Com-
munity Property States: Regulatory Haywire, 37 Sw. L.J. 1039 (1984).
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located in a community property state, then "a creditor may require the
signature of the spouse on any instrument necessary, or reasonably be-
lieved by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make
community property available to satisfy the debt in event of default.
8 7
Applicants residing in community property states-including California,
Texas, Washington and Arizona, among others-may have their marital
status investigated and may be required to provide a spousal cosignature
in order to qualify for credit.
The general effect of these rules, which have many complex permu-
tations in their interactions with state laws, is to bind married women,
and especially non-working married women, to the credit possibilities of
their spouses. The rationale behind the regulation speaks to creditors'
interests, especially where a non-working spouse applies for credit relying
on community property consisting mostly of income earned by the other
spouse."8 Nonetheless, women's banks do not have an incentive to fill this
breach, for as creditors, they also want protection against default. Unless
a woman has income of her own to guarantee the loan, the credit risk she
presents is relatively high. This restriction on lending preferences of the
women's banks is consistent with the women's banks' profit strategy,
which sought clients out of the class of women with money, a job, or a
business. Women without at least one of these qualifications are not usu-
ally good credit risks-for either women's banks or traditional banks.
On this narrow point ECOA and Reg B have not undercut the target
market for women's banks, but on the other hand, women without in-
come were never part of the women's banks' target market anyway.
Another loophole concerns Reg B's business credit exemption to the
"no inquiry into marital status" rule.89 This exception in ECOA poten-
tially increases the size of the women's bank target market because it
permits traditional banks wide latitude to discriminate against women's
businesses. Section 203.3(e) of Reg B permits creditors in business trans-
actions to inquire into parties' marital status where joint property is re-
lied upon to guarantee credit. One commentator has suggested that
"[s]uch a distinction and the resulting exemption for business credit may
be serious denials of protection to an increasing number of women who
are active in the work force and the business world."90
Women's banks would tend to find a promising clientele in women's
businesses denied credit through this loophole. Unlike the consumers
87. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(3) (1986) (emphasis added).
88. See Taylor, supra note 86, at 1045-55.
89. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1) (1986).
90. Blakely, supra note 82, at 665 n.61; see also Jacobs, supra note 81.
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without resources in the earlier category which the women's banks do
not include in the target market, women's businesses may have possibili-
ties of repayment. Thus this loophole in ECOA has a tendency to in-
crease the size of the women's target market. The climate in which
women were forced by sexism at traditional banks to seek out women's
banks, however, would also be a climate driving women out of the com-
mercial field altogether. This would, in such circumstances, operate as a
countertendency to reduce the target market.
Amending the loopholes in Reg B and ECOA may undercut some-
what the size of the women's banks' target market, but the statutes and
regulations may also have an opposite, synergistic effect beneficial to wo-
men's banks. As credit barriers fall in the general marketplace because
of regulation, and as the atmosphere becomes less hostile to women's
enterprises, the pool of women's businesses grows and the potential cus-
tomer base for women's banks correspondingly expands.91
Despite this synergy, the regulatory solution ECOA proposes is in
principle incompatible with the market solution proposed by women's
banks. The general tendency of ECOA is to reduce the target market for
women's banks because the regulatory changes, if enforced, give women
greater options for obtaining credit. They would not have to go to wo-
men's banks. Economically rational women would go to women's banks
only if those banks could provide them with a favorable interest rate or
other advantage, and it is not clear that women's banks could.
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments set forth in this Article, taken together, suggest that
stringently enforced regulation, and not reliance on marketplace solu-
tions, is the appropriate means to guarantee women horizontal equity
with similarly situated men in access to credit. This conclusion is based
on three considerations, all confirmed by the experience of women's
banks.
First, institutions such as women's banks, which attempt to arbi-
trage sexism out of the capital marketplace, cannot eliminate sexism in
access to credit at a rate faster than the general capital market permits.
To the degree that these women's institutions serve as a conduit for capi-
91. Much of the hardline view against credit for women's businesses makes perfectly good
sense to lenders from a non-gender laden viewpoint. According to a bank executive vice-
president, "'Women have been very successful in the service industries... [but] [t]here usu-
ally are no hard assets for collateral other than leasehold improvements.'" Jacobs, supra note
81 (quoting Patrick L. Flinn, executive vice-president of Citizens & Southern National Bank,
Atlanta).
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tal priced according to the sexist perceptions of the capital markets, they
reflect rather than change those perceptions. This conclusion is mitigated
where the mere fact of having a bank charter permits women's banks to
externalize part of those higher capital costs onto the federal government
and other banks through access to federal funds, deposit insurance and
other subsidies.
Second, if marketplace solutions merely reflect rather than change
the level of gender discrimination in the capital markets, then the only
real response to achieve access to credit is regulation. This Article has
not addressed the regulatory changes that are necessary to guarantee
equal access to credit and has instead focused on why the marketplace
solution is inadequate. However, it also has identified inadequacies in
ECOA such as the spousal cosignature rules and the business credit
exemptions.
At a minimum, of course, any regulatory system must be effectively
enforced, otherwise the result is the institutionalization of less blatant,
but just as objectionable, gender discrimination. The more fundamental
question for any regulatory regime in combatting credit discrimination,
however, is the degree to which the regulations ought to promote more
than mere horizontal equity between men and women of similar eco-
nomic resources, and actually cause a transfer of wealth and credit to
women-vertical equity-who would not, even in a discrimination free
environment, quali* for credit. Neither women's banks nor existing fed-
eral legislation have sought to achieve wealth transfers.92
Third, a regulatory solution to credit discrimination tends to dis-
place marketplace solutions by eliminating the discrimination which gave
rise to the target market in the first place. A wholly successful ECOA
displaces women's banks insofar as they pursue a women oriented mar-
ket strategy.
92. Since the real problem faced by most women is lack of income leading to lack of credit,
rather than women of income lacking credit, arguably the real issue concerning women's ac-
cess to credit ought not to be mere equal access for women of means, but instead the use of the
credit system to transfer income to women.
Any debate over the merits of wealth transfers is likely to be heated, invoking notions of
fairness and distributional justice. It is noteworthy, however, that marketplace solutions to
women's credit access, such as women's banks, effectively frame the problem and the solution
so as to preclude a policy of wealth transfers, since women's banks seem to have made a profit
and could only have done so by extending credit to women with income. Only a regulatory
regime permits the explicit choice between horizontal equity and wealth transfer policies.
Nonetheless, both banks and existing federal regulation may be seen as compromise positions
which tend to foreclose the possibility of real wealth transfers by having, in effect, bought off
for mere horizontal equity the women of income who might otherwise agitate for both hori-
zontal and vertical equity. See infra note 95.
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This leaves, then, the question of the future of women's banks.
Clearly, the trend is that women's banks have abandoned a woman ori-
ented market strategy-the names of women's banks, for example, have
either changed or will slowly turn into a quaint anachronism, much like
the names of many older banking institutions.9 Because women's banks
may continue to be principally owned and managed by women, they be-
come simply another group of businesses owned by women. Or, like
FWBM, they may sell out to male investors, leaving only a historical
shell of their past relationship to either women as owners and managers
or women as a target credit market.94 In either case, as that process
moves forward, women's banks become less and less relevant to the dis-
cussion of credit access for women-a position sometimes urged by the
owners of women's banks themselves.95
Women's banks remain an instructive institution, however, in defin-
ing the direction that the struggle for women's access to credit ought to
take. That direction is regulation, with a full-blown debate over whether
the regulatory regime ought to create wealth transfers to women who
lack the income necessary to secure credit. There is no substitute for
changes in the market rules themselves to eliminate gender
discrimination.
93. For example, the Seamen's Bank was originally organized to serve particular popula-
tions but has gradually become like any other bank.
94. See supra note 7.
95. For example, in 1979, the chairwoman of the California Coastal Bank (previously The
Women's Bank) [San Diego, California] remarked that "[n]one of us on the board ever wanted
this bank to be in the position that it was cause-oriented"--meaning, oriented to the course of
women's credit access. The president of California Coastal went on to say that "[t]he real
purpose [of women's banks] was to allow minorities to serve on boards and in management
positions. It was not, as some assume, primarily to service the minorities. Enough pressure
could be exerted on existing financial institutions to achieve that purpose." Hellyer, What's in
a Name? AM. BANKEus Ass'N BANKING J., May 1979, at 104.
It remains for another article to discuss whether such women's institutions as women's
banks legitimate the failure to create wealth transfers which would help alleviate the growing
feminization of poverty. See generally R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT
OF THE POOR IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986).
Women's banks may be seen as exemplifying institutions which, in pursuit of horizontal
equity serving managerial and business women, tacitly consent to a denial of wealth transfers
to poor and working class women. Indeed, women's banks are, in one sense, the examplepar
excellence, since they illustrate women triaging other women for loans, sorting them out pre-
cisely according to their wealth and ability to pay, and thereby explicitly denying wealth trans-
fers. Pursuit of this strongly critical, structuralist claim would require the background theory
of legitimation and rationalization in monopoly capitalism, and thus is appropriate for a sepa-
rate discussion. However, for a general overview of such critical theory applied to law, see
Brosnan, Serious but Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV, 259 (1987). With luck, we will one day
see critical theory and feminism applied to the complex relations between women in poverty
and women of income.
